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Note to Schmooze participants:  I have taken advantage of Mark’s invitation to present 
informal work by presenting a modified version of a grant proposal for a database 
project.  I appreciate your understanding and feedback at this early stage of the project.  
The project relates to the theme of “Juristocracy” in two ways: first it will provide 
systematic data on the constitutional status of the judiciary over time and space; and 
second it will catalog trends in rights provisions that are so often the fulcrum for 
judicialization efforts.  TG 
 
 
Overview 
Waves of national independence and democratization have deposited a varying set 
of political and legal institutions across the world in the last fifty years.  For the most 
part, these institutions are set out formally in national constitutions.  However, no 
systematic dataset exists that records the characteristics and provisions of national 
constitutions.  Such a basic set of data is indispensable for the simple, but important, goal 
of describing and comparing constitutions.  It is also indispensable, as we submit below, 
for testing theoretical predictions about the origins and consequences of various 
constitutional provisions.  As such, we propose to construct a comprehensive dataset of 
the form and content of national constitutions, past and present. 
Theoretical Motivations 
While these data will likely have general applicability to a broad range of research 
questions (see the next section), a motivating question for the principal investigators 
concerns the historical roots of certain institutions.  In particular, the investigators intend 
to use the data to test predictions regarding the diffusion of constitutional design 
elements.  Our basic expectation, stated quite generally, is that the constitutional 
provisions of peer countries have a decisive impact on the decisions of constitutional 
engineers regardless of a state’s particular institutional needs and constraints.  
Constitutions are influenced not just by domestic political bargains, but by trends, ideas 
and models adopted from other constitutions. These ideas and models diffuse across 
space and time.  Our  intention is to test diffusion hypotheses with a comprehensive set of 
cross-national, historical data.  We will determine (i) whether diffusion theories explain 
                                                 
* Department of Political Science and College of Law, University of Illinois Urbana-
Champaign 
 
  Elkins and Ginsburg, p. 2 
constitutional change, and (ii) which aspects of constitutional design are most susceptible 
to diffusion. 
The investigators’ diffusion framework, although complementary to traditional 
approaches to constitutional design, departs from these approaches.  Traditional 
explanations of constitutional design focus on interests, passions, and the public good 
(Elster 1996).  Interest-based accounts (e.g. Mueller 2000; Cooter 2003) focus on rational 
choice of self-interested designers.  Other scholars, however, emphasize emotions and 
constraints on rational choice (e.g., Elster et al., 1997).  A third school of thought, 
captured in most normative legal scholarship, suggests that constitutional drafters are 
motivated by a higher purpose and that constitutions are designed with the best interests 
of the public in mind. 
Our diffusion perspective does not contradict these causal stories.  However, it 
does introduce an altogether different set of factors.  Diffusion, which we define as a 
general set of processes by which one government’s adoption of a constitutional element 
affects the probability that another actor adopt the same element (Elkins 2003; Simmons 
and Elkins 2004), emphasizes the influence of factors external to the state.  Context and 
fashion, in this line of reasoning, matter as much as a government’s particular propensity 
for a given institution.  Exactly when and how context matters, of course, is the critical 
theoretical question of interest to the investigators.  The investigators have identified 
various plausible diffusion processes with respect to institutional development (Elkins 
2003; Elkins and Simmons 2005), each of which implies an hypothesis testable with the 
dataset the investigators propose to construct.  For example, the investigators expect that 
the cognitive and research capabilities of constitutional designers are constrained in 
predictable patterns.  One pattern is that designers pay disproportionate attention to the 
constitutions of states that are highly “available,” in the sense of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982).  So, we should expect that the constitutions of countries with high levels of 
interaction and communication (measured by levels of trade, linguistic similarity, 
telephone flows, or mail flows) will be more accessible and, so, more similar.  For similar 
reasons, we should expect the constitutions of geographically proximate states to show 
marked similarities.  On the other hand, it might be the case that constitutional learning 
follows a different pattern.  It might be that constitutional framers model their institutions 
after countries that are similar to theirs in important ways, reasoning that what is good for 
an analogous state will be good for them.  In a similar vein, it might be that a state’s 
success – measured by political stability or wealth – inspires imitators.   
Diffusion explanations are intriguing because they imply that governments are 
making choices that they would not make if left to their own devices (if such a thing were 
possible in constitution-writing).  These “detours” in the policy process are indeed 
interesting from an historical or political development perspective.  However, they also 
portend important consequences for the quality of government policies.  We see two 
interesting possibilities.  Diffusion may imply that governments adopt sub-optimal or 
inappropriate policies designed for the needs of others.  Alternatively, diffusion may 
imply that governments adopt policies superior to those they have the resources or 
knowledge to engineer for themselves.  The question, then, is whether diffusion is 
responsible for a nation’s squeezing into ill-fitting, but fashionable institutions or whether 
it leads them to the most functional and efficient ones available?  We might lean towards 
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the first conclusion, if only for a  cultural preference for creativity and originality over 
imitation and conformity.  However, the second conclusion appears equally plausible, 
especially after a number of scholars have begun to burnish the image of imitation, 
emphasizing its utility as a cognitive shortcut for problems whose answers are not always 
obvious (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  Imitation, in this light, is not slavish.  It is an 
efficient and effective mode of behavior for policy makers.  We aspire to draw 
conclusions regarding the social welfare implications of diffusion processes.  The first 
step, however, is to specify the causal sequence of events. 
The proper testing of the hypotheses we suggest above requires data on a 
country’s basic political and economic attributes as well as its relationship with other 
countries (Simmons and Elkins 2004).  Most importantly, however, the analysis requires 
systematic measurement of similarity across national constitutions.  It is these measures 
of similarity that we expect to construct from the dataset we describe below.   
A Resource for other Scholars 
We expect that the dataset we describe will be useful to a large number of social 
scientists concerned with the origins and impacts of political and legal institutions.  Most 
obviously, a formal accounting of institutional elements of constitutions makes for a 
ready set of independent and dependent variables that allow political scientists, 
economists, and public law scholars to test many of the institutional arguments popular in 
these disciplines.  Crucially, a measure of particular components of constitutions allows 
scholars to analyze and describe discrete elements of important constructs such as 
presidentialism, parliamentarism, federalism, judicial review, and electoral systems.  
Amendment processes will also be documented (Lutz 1994). The dataset, as we envision 
it, also makes for a useful resource to study institutional evolution and adaptation within 
states across time.  How resistant to change are institutional designs?  Under what 
conditions do institutions change?   
Another research program might use the data to compare the match between a 
state’s formal institutional framework and its actual conduct.  Some scholars have 
suggested that the dictates of a constitution are sometimes at odds with actual behavior.  
In order to test these claims, one needs a systematic accounting of constitutional 
elements.  The dataset will allow scholars to evaluate different configurations of 
institutions and their effect on, for example, democratic performance, economic growth, 
and other dependent variables of interest (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2003).   
We should emphasize that the dataset will include variables pertaining to the form 
and style of the written document, not just its institutional provisions.  As we describe 
below, we intend to code characteristics of the structure, organization, length, and style of 
the documents.  This may provide tools for innovative research programs on the 
specificity of constitutions. 
Constitutional scholars are paying increasing attention to the global aspects of 
constitutionalism, including both the spread of particular human rights provisions and an 
increasing transnational “conversation” of judges in interpreting the constitution 
(Slaughter 2003).The database will provide a resource to document the spread of 
particular rights and linguistic features in a systermatic fashion. Finally, explanatory 
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power notwithstanding, we suspect that describing the way in which states have chosen to 
craft constitutions, and how these choices have varied over time, will be interesting in its 
own right.  Such a descriptive resource can be of great value in both research and 
teaching.   
Proposed Indicators 
An important and delicate task in this project is the selection of those attributes of 
constitutions that we wish to record.  At this point we have identified approximately 200 
aspects -- of both form and content – of written constitutions that we believe are worth 
measuring.  In constructing this list we have reviewed works from the literature on 
comparative constitutions as well as the limited number of data projects.  In this regard, 
the Maarseveen and van der Tang (1978) volume has served a particularly useful 
foundation from which to build, as has the key system that was developed by 
Tschentscher (2004).  However, neither of these earlier efforts is sufficient in our view.   
 We have adopted several major categories of variables. 
I. Amendment processes 
II. Rights 
III. Duties (e.g. military service, obedience) 
IV. Elections (includes political party regulation, suffrage, referenda) 
V. Government Structure: Executive 
VI. Government Structure: Legislature 
VII. Judiciary 
VIII. Constitutional court 
IX. Other constitutional institutions (ombudsmen, human rights 
commission) 
X. Federalism/Local government 
XI. International Law 
XII. Other Characteristics 
One issue is the proper level of detail we ought include in the coding.  Our current list of 
“rights,” for example, included some 200 different variables.  This may be beyond the 
scope of our effort to achieve. 
 
As an example of the kinds of questions we seek to code for, the following list is a 
provisional set of questions in the “Judiciary” section. 
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A. Administrative Law 
 
Does the constitution provide for a administrative court? (1/0) 
 How appointed? 
Nomination by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-
legislative supermajority; 5-judicial council 
Approval by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-
legislative supermajority; 5-judicial council 
 Term length? (ordinal) 
Does the constitution contain provisions protecting the individual against illegal/ultra vires 
administrative actions?(1/0) 
 
B. Constitutional Court 
 
Does the constitution contain provisions concerning a special constitutional court(1/0) 
Does the Constitutional court have powers besides reviewing legislation and treaties for 
constitutionality? (1/0) 
 What are the powers?  
  1-supervisiong elections; 2-supervising political parties; 3-impeachment 
  4-states of emergency; 5-reviewing organic statutes of local government; 6-other 
What is the term of justices? (ordinal) 
How are justices appointed? 
Nomination by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-
legislative supermajority; 5-judicial council 
Approval by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-
legislative supermajority; 5-judicial council 
Who has standing to refer a question? 1-presdient, executive organs; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative 
majority; 4-legislative minority; 5-public 
What is the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality? 
  
What is timing of review? 1-post-promulgation; 2-pre-promulgation; 3-either 
 
C.  Judicial Independence 
 
Does the constitution contain an explicit declaration regarding the independence of the central 
judicial organ(s)? (1/0) 
Does the constitution stipulate that judges can be impeached? (1/0) 
Is a majority or supermajority required for impeachment? 1-majority; 2-supermajority 
Who is involved in the impeachment of judges? 1-legislature, 2-executive, 3-judiciary; 4-judicial 
council 
Does the constitution stipulate that courts have to take into account decisions of higher courts? 
(1/0) 
 
D. Judicial Appointment 
Does the constitution stipulate in what way people become members of ordinary courts 
Nomination by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-legislative 
supermajority; 5-judicial council 
Approval by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-legislative 
supermajority; 5-judicial council 
Are judicial terms specified for ordinary judges? (1/0) How long? (ordinal) 
Does the constitution stipulate in what way people become members of the highest ordinary court 
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Nomination by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-legislative 
supermajority; 5-judicial council 
Approval by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-legislative 
supermajority; 5-judicial council 
Are judicial terms specified for the supreme court? (1/0) How long? (ordinal) 
 
 
E. Powers 
 
Does the constitution contain provisions with regard to advisory opinions of ordinary judicial 
organs? (1/0) 
Does the constitution contain provisions allowing review of ordinary legislation by judicial and/or 
other state-organs(1/0) 
Does the constitution stipulate whether decisions of the highest ordinary court are final (in 
general) (1/0) 
Sampling Considerations 
The proposed unit of analysis in this study is the country-year.  The resulting 
dataset will, therefore, report characteristics of constitutions in force for each year.  The 
alternative, and perhaps more intuitive, approach would be to treat each constitution as a 
unit.  However, distinguishing discrete constitutions within a country’s history is 
sometimes problematic.  Some countries do have constitutions that are clearly distinct 
documents and are recorded as such (e.g., the Brazilian constitutions of 1988, 1968, 
1945, and 1889).  Other countries, however, make substantial modifications to a 
constitution without renaming the document (e.g. South Korea’s six republics since 
independence have each been created through what are technically constitutional 
amendments). Some countries may make only modest modifications but celebrate a 
“new” constitution.  As such, dividing documents into discrete drafts or versions invokes 
a set of unnecessary judgments in our view.  Our preference is to document modifications 
in constitutions as they occur.  Under this process, “new” constitutions will be obvious to 
the extent that they exhibit form and content that is distinct from those in the document of 
the prior year.  While the country-year approach appears daunting, we believe it will be 
manageable.  For each constitution, we will obtain information on constitutional 
amendments and use these to describe the shifts over time within each country. As a 
practical matter, the dataset would include only those country years for which a change 
occurs.  For analytical purposes, of course, older values can be carried over to intervening 
years in which no change occurs in order to construct an uninterrupted time series. 
In terms of coverage across time and space, our goal is to be comprehensive.  The 
advantage of this sort of dataset, we believe, is to cover a large set of countries and time 
periods in a systematic way.  Furthermore, the availability of national constitutions 
encourages us to be expansive.  Texts of worldwide constitutions (at least current 
versions) are available for most independent states, great and small (e.g., Flanz and 
Blaustein 2004; Tschentscher 2004) 
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Dissemination of Results 
 The investigators will design a web site to disseminate the dataset and any 
publications related to it.  The dataset will also be archived at the University of 
Michigan’s ICPSR data archive. 
Conclusion 
The database project described herein will allow us to systematically analyze the 
diffusion of constitutional ideas and institutions, and to test whether and when similar 
countries adopt similar constitutions.  Beyond our immediate research concerns, 
however, we believe the database will provide a useful resource for a broader research 
program on formal aspects of constitutions.  This is an area of growing research interest 
in law and the social sciences, and informs issues of continuing importance to policy-
makers involved in legal and constitutional reform efforts.   
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